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Abstract
Entry Models such as Bresnahan and Reiss(91)[4] can under-
estimate the e¤ect of competition. If the protability of markets
is mismeasured, this introduces an positive correlation between
unoberserved protability and the number of rms in a market.
Using data on entry and exit patterns in the Ready-Mix Con-
crete Industry from 1976-1999, I show that using xed e¤ects
in a Bresnahan-Reiss entry model reduces the coe¢ cient on de-
mand by 50% and increases the coe¢ cient on competition by
100% compared to the no xed-e¤ect benchmark.
1 Introduction
Following the work of Bresnahan and Reiss(91)[4], entry models have be-
come popular for empirical work in industrial organization. This is due
to their solid grounding in economic theory, in which they are an outcome
of a well specied game between rms, and to the ease of estimating a
Bresnahan-Reiss model versus other more sophisticated models of entry
such as Aguiregabierra and Mira(04)[1] or Bajari-Benkard-Levin(05)[3].
Along with popularity of entry models come the use of these model to
increasingly less ideal data, in which markets may be ill-dened, sources
of actual demand poorly measured and di¤erences between competitors
unrecognized. Following the lead of work in labor economics on esti-
mating the returns to education (Angrist and Krueger (1999)[2]), panel
data is used to identify and reduce bias in entry models. Empirical esti-
mates show that including market xed e¤ects raises the coe¢ cient on
competition by over 100% and lowers that of demand by 50%, in an
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application to entry and reaction to demand shocks in the ready-mix
concrete industry.
The ready-mix concrete industry is particularly well suited to study
entry in geographically segmented markets because it sells such a perish-
able product: ASTM C 94 also requires that concrete be delivered and
discharged within 1 1/2 hours or before the drum has revolved 300 times
after introduction of water to the cement and aggregates.1 Moreover,
concrete is very cheap for its weight. Indeed, one ready-mix producer de-
scribes the economics of transportation costs in the ready-mix industry
as:
A truckload of concrete contains about 7 cubic yards of con-
crete. A cubic yard of concrete weights about 4000 pounds
and will cost you around 60$ delivered to your door. Thats
1.5 cents a pound. If you go to your local hardware store,
you get a bag of manure weighing 10 pounds for 5$. This
means that concrete is cheaper than shit.2
So in practise, the delivery radius of ready-mix is even more con-
strained and in most cases a ready-mix truck will drive about 20 minutes
to deliver its load. This is the cause of concretes most salient feature:
very segmented markets with a limited number of incumbents in each
area. Beyond the issue of segmentation, Ready-Mix concrete is a fairly
homogenous good. While it is possible to produce several hundred types
of Ready-Mix concrete, these mixtures basically use the same ingredi-
ents and machinery. As well, in part because of fairly aggressive vertical
antitrust policy conducted by the United States Government, the aver-
age ready-mix producer is a single plant operator, reducing problems of
multiplant decision making.
A ready-mix concrete plant is expensive to set up. The most im-
portant cost is constructing the physical structure for loading ready-mix
concrete and dispensing it into mixing trucks, as well as other buildings
such as garages. In addition, the land on which the plant is located much
be purchased, as well as ready-mix trucks which cost around US$120 000
new and US$ 40 000 used. All together, the cost of setting up a ready-
mix plant is between 3 and 4 millions dollars based, on a dozen interviews
of established producers building new plants, and the average value of
an existing plant is about 2 million dollars in 1997.
There are few large costs for shutting down a ready-mix plant. Trucks
can be sold on a competitive used vehicle market, and land can be resold
1See p.96 of Kosmatka, Kerkho¤ et al.(02)[8].
2Phone interview, January 2005.
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for other uses. However, the plant itself is a total loss. At best it can
be resold for scrap metal, but many ready-mix plants are left on site
because the cost of dismantling them outweights any benets. Over all,
the scrap value of a plant is at most 1 millions dollars, based almost
exclusively on the value of a ready-mix truck eet and the value of the
land on which the plant is located.
2 Statics: Bresnahan Reiss Models
Static models, such as Bresnahan-Reiss[4], can be used to investigate the
presence of sunk costs in ready-mix concrete. This model does not com-
pute the value function from period prots. Instead, the value function
is directly estimated, without reference to what will happen in the fu-
ture, from the current conguration of rms in a market. This "reduced
form" model is used to check for a wide variety of empirical problems,
such as di¤erent assumptions on the shocks to rms prots. Being a
reduced form, it cannot be used for many counterfactual exercices.
The rst Bresnahan Reiss[4] model is based on two assumptions:
1. Firms that Enter make Positive Prots
(N;Xm) + "m > 0
2. If an extra rm entered it would make negative prots:
(N + 1; Xm) + "m < 0
where (N;Xm) is the oberservable component of prot depending
on demand side factors Xm and the number of symmettric competitors
in a market N , while "m are unobserved components of protability
common to all rms in a market.
Assume market level shocks "m have a normal distribution with zero
mean and unit variance. The probability of observing a market Xm with
N plants is:
[ (N + 1; Xm)]  [ (N;Xm)]1(N > 0)
where (:) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal. Parameters of this model can be estimated via Maximum Like-
lihood.
Firms make sunk, unrecoverable investments when they enter a mar-
ket. The decision of an incumbent rm to remain in a market di¤ers
from the decision of an entrant to build a new plant. The next series of
models deal with this di¤erence.
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Figure 1: Entry Threshold  and Exit Threshold  based on static
prots.
2.1 Bresnahan-Reiss Model of Exit
The Bresnahan-Reiss[5] Model of Exit distinguishes between two types
of rms: rms which are already active and rms which are deciding
to enter the market. Entrants and incumbents have the same shocks
and prots, and hence the same continuation values. However, entrants
always have lower prots than incumbents, since they pay an entry cost
that incumbents do not, as is shown by gure 1. This implies that there
cannot be simultaneous entry and exit: either rms exit, enter, or noth-
ing happens. This is a feature of all models which do not have rm
specic shocks and where rms are symmettric: they cannot rational-
ize the same type of plant in the same market making di¤erent choices.
Thus market-years in which there is both entry and exit are dropped.
For this paper, yearly data is used for markets with on average less than
3 incumbents. Thus less than 5% of markets need to be dropped. More-
over, including these markets does not signicantly change estimated
parameters. Three regimes need to be considered: entry, exit and stasis.
1. Net Entry: Nt > Nt 1
(Nt; Xmt) + "mt >  
(Nt + 1; Xmt) + "mt <  
2. Net Exit: Nt < Nt 1
(Nt; Xmt) + "mt > 
(Nt + 1; Xmt) + "mt < 
3. No Net Change: Nt = Nt 1
(Nt; Xmt) + "mt > 
(Nt + 1; Xmt) + "mt <  
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where  is the entry fee that an existing rm pays to enter the market
and  is the scrappage value of a rm. Entry fees and scrap value are not
identied from xed costs, since it is always possible to increase xed
costs and entry/exit fees by the same amount without changing the
probability a market conguration. Yet, the di¤erence between entry
and exit fees is identied and can be compared to other quantities such
as the e¤ect of an extra competitor.
These equations can be combined into:
(Nt; Xmt) + "mt > 1(Nt > Nt 1) + 1(Nt  Nt 1) (1)
(Nt + 1; Xmt) + "mt < 1(Nt  Nt 1) + 1(Nt < Nt 1) (2)
The probability of observing a market Xm with Nt plants today and
Nt 1 plants in the last period is:
[ (Nt + 1; Xmt) + 1(Nt + 1Nt 1) + 1(Nt + 1 < Nt 1)]
 [ (Nt; Xmt) + 1(Nt>Nt 1) + 1(Nt  Nt 1)]1(Nt > 0)
which is used to form a maximum likelihood estimator.
The assumption that the epsillons are serially uncorrelated within
markets is heroic. Characteristics of the market that are not observed in
the rst period, such as a vast road network requiring a large amount of
concrete, are the same in each subsequent period. Serial correlation of
" only a¤ect the standard errors of maximum likelihood. However, this
pattern of correlation can be used to indentify bias in the Bresnahan-
Reiss model. In the next section we will discuss the impact of unmea-
sured components of protability on estimated coe¢ cients.
2.2 Unobserved Protability
The canonical entry model will estimate the prot function for a rm in
di¤erent markets:
it = Xit + g(Nit) + "it (3)
where "it is a mean-zero stochastic term which is uncorrelated with
both demand (Xit) and number of rms (Nit), and g(:) is decreasing. The
assumption that "it is uncorrelated with regressors is frequently violated
in the context of entry models. The econometrician may not observe
certain components of protability, but rms most certainly do. They
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will react by entering in greater numbers in more protable markets,
leading to a positive correlation between " and N . Likewise, suppose
demand in large markets is qualitatively di¤erent than in small markets.
For instance, multistory buildings are constructed in greater proportion
in large markets relative to small markets. This induces an articial
correlation between market size and consumption of concrete.
Unobserved protability can be decomposed into its correlated com-
ponents:
"it = Xit(observed demand)+ Nit(rms)+  it (4)
where  it is an uncorrelated shock, mean zero shock.
If measured and unmeasured demand are positively correlated, say
because areas with large numbers of construction workers and projects
also have other features which make demand high, then  > 0. Simi-
larly, if rms react to unmeasured demand shocks by entering, we ex-
pect  > 0. Note that both statements refer to the correlation between
(unobserved demand) and Xit or Nit, while the values of  or  are
related to the conditional correlation E("XjN) or E("N jX), which are
di¢ cult to make statements about. In the case where the conditional
correlation has the same sign as the unconditional correlation, it is pos-
sible to sign the bias in this model:
The ordered probit model can be expressed as:
Xit + "it> g(Nit) (5)
Xit + "it< g(Nit + 1)
Using the expression 4, the ordered probit inequalities become:
Xit( + ) +  it> g(Nit)  Nit
Xit( + ) +  it< g(Nit + 1)  Nit
The estimated demand coe¢ cient ( + ) will be biased upward.
Likewise, since the e¤ect of competition is negative, the competitive
e¤ects of entry  [g(N) + ] will be biased downwards. If fact, this is
what is found in empirical estimates in table 2.
2.3 Bias in Threshold Ratios
The ratio of entry thresholds, used by Bresnahan and Reiss [4] to com-
pute the number of rms required in a market for its behaviour to be
competitive, may be overestimated.
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To see this, sign the inequality between true and estimated threshold
ratio needs to be evaluated:
g(Nit + 1) + (Nit + 1)
g(Nit) + Nit
><
g(Nit + 1)
g(Nit)
Mutiply both sides of this inequality by [g(Nit) + Nit]g(Nit). This
quantity will be a positive number under the assumption that  g(Nit+
1) > Nit, that unobserved components of protability correlated with
the number of rms does not outweight the observed e¤ect. Rearranging
and cancelling gives:
[Nit + 1]
Nit
<>
g(Nit + 1)
g(Nit)
In the specic case of Cournot Competition, g(N +1)=g(N) = (N +
1)2=N2 which decreases less quickly than (N + 1)=N . If competition
decreases prots at more than rate 1=N the true ratio of thresholds will
be overestimated. An example is shown in gure 2.3, in which entry
thresholds are overestimated with respect to their xed e¤ect counter-
parts, but only slightly. Indeed, because competition decreasing prots
at rate 1=N is such a plausible model, the bias in the threshold ratio will
undoubtly be small.
7
2.4 Panel Data Solution
The panel structure of data can be used to eliminate bias in entry models,
as discussed in the context of labor economics by Angrist and Kruger[2].
Unobserved shocks to protability can be decomposed into:
"it = mi(market e¤ect)+ yt(year e¤ect)+ it
a component which remains constant over a markets life(mi), a com-
ponent which represents aggregate shocks common to all markets in a
year (yt) while the remaining unobserved elements are grouped into a
mean zero shock it. Estimates are biased to the extent that it is cor-
related with demand and number of rms:
it = ^Xit + ^Nit + ^ it
This correlation is likely much smaller than before. Ultimately, the
most convincing solution to this problem is to use an instrumental vari-
able strategy. Find a variable zit which is uncorrelated with unobserved
protability ", but correlated with demand and number of plants, such
that E["z] = 0. It is then possible to use GMM to estimate an consistent
(if not e¢ cient) model of entry.
2.4.1 Computational Details
Fixed e¤ects are commonly introduced into discrete choice models by
conditioning techniques such as Chamberlains xed e¤ect logit [CITE].
In the case of ordered probit models with groups of 20 observations,
conditioning is computationally di¢ cult. Instead, a dummy variable per
market is added to the model, estimated using maximum likelihood as
any other demand parameter:
it = Xit +
KX
k=1
1(k = m)m + g(Nit)
Maximizing the likelihood involves solving for the value of over 3000
parameters, given the number of markets in the data. Fortunately, the
linear objective function along with the structure of an ordered probit
yields a globally concave likelihood function. This makes this problem
computationally feasible since globabally concave function are straigh-
forward to maximize. As well, the gradient of the likelihood is computed
analytically, bypassing the computation of a rather large number of nu-
merical derivatives. Finally, the market level xed e¤ect parameters are
incidental in the sense that their values are not of interest, just the
e¤ect they have on economically important parameters such sunk costs
and the e¤ects of competitors. The termination criteria reects this,
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requiring only that the likelihood to converge L(t) L(t 1) < " rather
than the full vector of parameters: kt   t 1k < . The number of it-
erations required to compute the solution of the model is reduced from
50 to about 5 without changing the value of economically relevant para-
meters. On a UNIX server, nding the xed e¤ect maximum likelihood
parameters takes approximately a day, but is faster for subsamples of
markets.
2.4.2 Random E¤ects Model
Another method for eliminating bias is think of "s as correlated accross
time. Assume that "s evolve according to the following process:
"mt = "mt 1 + mt
where mt is a mean-zero, uncorrelated shock and  is the correlation
coe¢ cient of unobservables. In the rst period, the standard Bresnahan-
Reiss model is used, and in subsequent periods. A simulation estimator
can be used for this model.
3 Market Denition
An important issue in the decision to enter or exit a market is the com-
petitive environment a rm faces, and in particular the number of com-
petitors in the market which erode its prots. I propose two market
denitions for the ready-mix concrete sector: county markets and iso-
lated town markets.
3.1 County Level
The rst market denition is the county market: every county in the
United States considered a separate market. This approach su¤ers from
several problems. First, counties vary greater in population and hence
a county such as Cook could be described as being composed of several
di¤erent submarkets while smaller rural counties such as Brown (IL)
are components of a larger regional market. Second, most counties in
the United States were constituted long before settlement, and hence
they are often not centered on a central place (except for particularly
rural counties where the county seat is the only agglomeration of any
importance). Third, some counties in the Western States tend to be
very large (in particular Arizona has only 12 counties while Illinois has
almost one hundred). With these provisos in mind, counties still form a
useful benchmark for market denition since they are consistently coded
in Census dataset and have not changed geographically in the last 50
years (with a handful of notable exceptions).
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We have also constructed a table of neighboring counties using 3 dif-
ferent but nested measures:
 Adjacent Counties: Counties that border this county (up to 12).
 Within 20 miles: Counties whose nearest point is within 20 miles
of this county (up to 17).
 Within 30 miles: Counties whose nearest point is within 30 miles
of this county (up to 24).
These are constructed to try to control for the inuence of out of
county plants. In particular, there may be problems with counties lo-
cated near very large population centers having unusually large demand.
3.2 Place Selection
A more natural approach to market denition is to focus on isolated
towns. This method was used by Bresnahan and Reiss[?] in their pio-
neering study of entry barriers in isolated retail activities. If anything
concrete o¤ers a more compelling basis for market segmentation since
transportation costs are high and transit time is restricted to less than
an hour because of the hardening of the concrete mixture. This creates
hard market segmentation, which is alleviated only by adding of certain
chemical compounds (known as admixtures) which can moderately in-
crease setting times by about 20%. For the purposes of this study, two
markets are distinct if they are:
 Over 4000 inhabitants in 1990.
 More than 20 miles from a place with more than 4000 inhabitants
in 1990.
 More than 30 miles from a place with more than 4000 inhabitants
in 1990 if the place has an interstate running through it.
(Towns within 1 mile of each other are considered as a single unit.)
An example of an isolated town is Tuba City, Arizona whose iso-
lation is illustrated by gure 4.While these screens are somewhat ad
hoc, the conceptual basis for them is far cleaner than in (Bresnahan
and Reiss 1990): concrete deteriorates fairly quickly as it is transported
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Minimal Size of Town to be considered
Minimal Distance to Closest Town 4000 Population 2000 Population
20 miles 375 404
30 miles 160 167
40 miles 81 89
Table 1: Number of Isolated Markets with Di¤erent Screens
away from the plant. An arbitrary sample of adjacent towns were used
in http://www.mapquest.com/ to test the link between driving time and
distance. In the vast majority of cases, a distance of 20 miles corresponds
to driving times of over 45 minutes. These screens produce the following
number of towns shown in table 1.
3.3 Zip Level
However, information about isolated towns does not lead us directly to
a market. While occupations such as dentists[5] are principally concen-
trated in towns, ready-mix concrete operators frequently tend to locate
on a towns outskirts, frequently outside the municipality proper, which
is the geography coded in the CMF. To rectify this problem, plants and
construction establishments are selected by Zip Code. The basic crite-
rion for inclusion of a zip code in the town/market is that a zip code
must be within 5 miles of town limits. The case of Tuba City for zip
codes is shown in gure 3.
There are also a few issues with using Zip codes to dene a market.
First, Zip codes are frequently of an irregular shape due to their primary
purpose: e¢ cient delivery of mail, following roads and going around
rivers. Second, Zip codes occasionally change due to the US postal
service rearranging its postal delivery scheme. On the other hand, Zip
codes are typically centered on these isolated towns, and hence form a
better t to the idea of market than might be expected.
3.4 Static Entry Estimates
Static Entry Models have been estimated both for county markets and
zip markets. Since the coe¢ cients for these two models are statistically
indistinguishable, we will focus presenting county market evidence where
there are fewer issues with shifting market denitions.
Estimating a xed e¤ect Bresnahan-Reiss model no simple undertak-
ing. Fixed e¤ect models for discrete data tend to rely on conditioning on
the total number of events choosen in a groups lifetime. However, for
an ordered probit model, this implies creating groups of the times the
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number of rms ranging from 0 to 20 was choosen. The total number
of groups quickly grows, making it di¢ cult to estimate the probability
that this number of groups occurs given the parameter vector. Instead,
coe¢ cients for each market are estimated, leading to a model with over
2000 parameters.
Results in table 2 for Bresnahan-Reiss Entry model and table 3 for
Sunk-Cost Bresnahan-Reiss Estimator. Note that the coe¢ cient on de-
mand is more than halved and the coe¢ cient on number of competitors
becomes twice as negative when xed e¤ects are added to the model.
If we care about the reaction of the number of establishments to
changes in demand, such as recessions. In this application, we really
care about distinguishing xed market characteristics such as popula-
tion from employment in the construction sector. As is shown in gure
2, adding xed e¤ects dramatically lowers the response of a market to
demand shocks.
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Figure 2: Entry and Exit Thresholds for Standard Model and Fixed
E¤ect Model.
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Demand Variables in Thousands County Fixed E¤ect S.E No E¤ect S.E.
County Employement 0.280 (0.045) 0.706 (0.018)
Construction Payroll -0.003 (0.001) -0.008 (0.001)
Concrete Intensity adjusted
Construction Employement -0.672 (0.316) -0.230 (0.209)
Concrete Intensity adjusted
Construction Payroll 0.027 (0.012) 0.008 (0.008)
Adjacent Construction Employement -0.028 (0.009) 0.002 (0.002)
Within 10 miles
Construction Employement -0.003 (0.011) 0.010 (0.002)
Within 20 miles County
Construction Employement 0.025 (0.006) 0.004 (0.001)
Adjacent Construction Payroll 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Within 10 miles County
Construction Payroll 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Within 20 miles County
Construction Employement 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Year E¤ects Yes Yes
Competitive Variables
1 competitior -2.339 (0.030) -0.910 (0.011)
2 competitor -1.452 (0.023) -0.700 (0.011)
3 competitior -1.109 (0.026) -0.560 (0.014)
4 competitor -0.891 (0.031) -0.700 (0.011)
5 competitior -0.797 (0.036) -0.560 (0.014)
6 competitor -0.617 (0.039) -0.472 (0.017)
More than 6 -0.696 (0.029) -0.560 (0.014)
Log Likelihood -13575 -25536
Wald 13021 6678
Number of Observations 18025 18025
Table 2: Bresnahan-Reiss Estimates with and without county xed ef-
fects
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Demand Variables in Thousands County Fixed E¤ect S.E No E¤ect S.E.
County Employement 0.142 (0.057) 0.520 (0.022)
Construction Payroll -0.001 (0.001) -0.005 (0.001)
Concrete Intensity adjusted
Construction Employement -0.385 (0.444) -0.184 (0.278)
Concrete Intensity adjusted
Construction Payroll 0.021 (0.017) 0.012 (0.011)
Adjacent Construction Employement -0.012 (0.013) 0.005 (0.002)
Within 10 miles
Construction Employement -0.035 (0.016) 0.012 (0.003)
Within 20 miles County
Construction Employement 0.031 (0.009) -0.002 (0.001)
Adjacent Construction Payroll 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Within 10 miles County
Construction Payroll -0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Within 20 miles County
Construction Payroll 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Year E¤ects Yes Yes
Competitive Variables
1 competitior -2.195 (0.054) -0.645 (0.020)
2 competitor -1.671 (0.045) -0.683 (0.021)
3 competitior -1.258 (0.046) -0.554 (0.023)
4 competitor -1.048 (0.052) -0.458 (0.025)
5 competitior -0.898 (0.058) -0.419 (0.029)
6 competitor -0.745 (0.061) -0.395 (0.034)
More than 6 -0.897 (0.040) -0.471 (0.022)
Exit Threshold 1.364 (0.317) -1.555 (0.058)
Entry Threshold 4.743 (0.319) 1.665 (0.058)
Log Likelihood -5021 -9154
Wald 5261.9 2598
Number of Observations 18025 18025
Table 3: Standard and Fixed E¤ect Sunk Cost Bresnahan-Reiss Esti-
mates for County Markets
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Figure 3: Zip Codes around Tuba City.
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Figure 4: Isolated Place: Tuba City, Arizona.
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Parameter Standard Error
Constant 0.56 (0.09)
Inhabitants (in millions) 7.57 (1.60)
Vacant Housing (in millions) -1.49 (2.60)
Interstate within 5 miles -0.24 (0.11)
1 competitor -1.10 (0.07)
2 competitor -0.79 (0.07)
3 competitor -0.65 (0.09)
4 competitor -0.27 (0.09)
More than 4 competitors -0.25 (0.07)
Number of observations 449
Wald chi2(3) 25.16
Log Likelihood -653
Table 4: Bresnahan-Reiss Model for Zip Markets
Bresnahan-Reiss Estimates of Zip and County Models
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
alpha1 alpha2 alpha3 alpha4
Zip
County
Figure 5: Zip and County Markets give e¤ects of competition. Bars
represent 95% condence intervals on parameter estimates.
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